Towards adaptive management: examining the strategies of policy entrepreneurs in Dutch water management by Brouwer, S. & Biermann, F.
Copyright © 2011 by the author(s). Published here under license by the Resilience Alliance.
Brouwer, S., and F. Biermann. 2011. Towards adaptive management: examining the strategies of policy
entrepreneurs in Dutch water management. Ecology and Society 16(4): 5.
http://dx.doi.org/10.5751/ES-04315-160405
Research
Towards Adaptive Management: Examining the Strategies of Policy
Entrepreneurs in Dutch Water Management
Stijn Brouwer 1 and Frank Biermann 1
ABSTRACT. The growing awareness of the complexities and uncertainties in water management has put into question the
existing paradigms in this field. Increasingly more flexible, integrated, and adaptive policies are promoted. In this context, the
understanding of how to effect policy change is becoming more important. This article analyzes policy making at the micro
level, focusing on the behavior of policy entrepreneurs, which we understand here as risk-taking bureaucrats who seek to change
policy and are involved throughout the policy-change process. Policy entrepreneurs have received a certain level of attention
in the adaptive co-management literature and the policy sciences in past decades. Yet, the understanding of the actions they can
take to facilitate policy change remains limited. This study addresses this gap in focusing on the strategies that policy entrepreneurs
employ in their efforts to effect policy change. The article draws on both theoretical exploration and in-depth field research on
water management in the Netherlands, which included a series of semi-structured interviews and a focus group with policy
entrepreneurs. We conclude that policy entrepreneurs employ four types of strategies: (1) attention and support-seeking strategies,
to demonstrate the significance of a problem and to convince a wide range of participants about their preferred policy; (2) linking
strategies, to link with other parties, projects, ideas, and policy games; (3) relational management strategies, to manage the
relational factor in policy-change trajectories; and finally, (4) arena strategies, to influence the time and place wherein decisions
are made. Our study suggests that by employing these strategies when the “time is right,” the development of policy streams
and consequently their coupling can, to some extent, be influenced and steered. In other words, policy entrepreneurs can, to a
degree, prepare for a window of opportunity and hence direct policy change.
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INTRODUCTION
The capability to adapt to and direct change is an important
element of resilience in social-ecological systems (Gunderson
1999, Folke et al. 2005) as well as of strategies of earth system
governance (Biermann 2007). Scholars of the adaptive co-
management literature argue against traditional management
approaches that aim at optimal use and control of resources.
Instead, the management of social-ecological systems should
be continuously updating its goals, measures, and policies
(Olsson et al. 2004, Hahn et al. 2006, Plummer and Armitage
2007). The overall goal of adaptive management is less about
maintaining an optimal condition of a resource and more about
building up management capacity to cope with change and
unpredictability. To achieve that, managers should view their
actions and policies as experiments and involve and
collaborate with stakeholders. This allows the system to react
and its managers to respond to changing conditions (Walters
and Holling 1990, Johnson 1999). Adaptive co-management
combines the strengths of this approach with the link
characteristic of collaborative management (Armitage et al.
2007). 
These insights are highly relevant in the area of water
management. Here, a growing awareness of the complexities
and uncertainties has generated critical consideration of
existing water management paradigms, and it has promoted
more flexible and adaptive strategies. Among others, it has
been suggested that a transition is under way to “soft path”
managerial and governance solutions to ecological problems
that complement the previously favored “hard path” physical
infrastructure (Gleick 2003). Accordingly, the capability to
direct change will be important in any water management
system. We aim to deepen understanding of the way in which
change can be directed. 
Various authors (see, e.g., Ostrom 1965, Kuhnert 2001, Olsson
et al. 2006) have argued that the role of individual actors is
essential in shaping change to achieve the flexibility needed
to deal with ecosystem dynamics. The important role of
individuals in advancing policy change has also been
emphasized at the level of international policies, for example,
in comprehensive studies on the influence of the lead executive
officers of international organizations (Biermann and
Siebenhüner 2009). Since the early 1980s, this topic has
received attention from various policy scientists (see, e.g.,
Kingdon 1984, King and Roberts 1987, Weissert 1991,
Baumgartner and Jones 1993), who have shown that there is
room for individual actors to help stimulate or redirect debate
about policy issues. Building and synthesizing upon this work,
scholars have given increasing attention to policy
entrepreneurs (see, e.g., Young 1991, Schiller 1995, Schneider
et al. 1995, Mintrom and Vergari 1996, 1998, Mintrom 2000).
Yet, there remain important gaps in our knowledge. Apart
from studies by Roberts and King (1991) and Huitema and
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Meijerink (2009a, 2010), analyses of what policy
entrepreneurs actually do have been rather general. None of
the existing studies systematically specifies the actions that
policy entrepreneurs take at the subnational, regional level,
where most practical projects are carried out. 
Our effort is thus mainly intended to analyze the actions of
policy entrepreneurs at the subnational, regional project level.
The main research question is “What strategies can policy
entrepreneurs employ in their efforts to pursue policy
change?” We have organized this article in four sections. The
first section introduces the literature on policy entrepreneurs
and distinguishes them from other actors in policy making.
The second section elaborates on the research design and
introduces the context of the study. The third section identifies
and classifies strategies of policy entrepreneurs, drawing on
an extensive theoretical exploration, a series of in-depth
interviews, and a focus group with policy entrepreneurs in
Dutch water management. The final section reflects on the
actions of policy entrepreneurs and what they imply for
understanding policy change.
POLICY ENTREPRENEURS
Initially, “entrepreneur” basically meant “businessman.” The
French economist Say first coined the term in 1800, defining
an entrepreneur as a person who “shifts economic resources
out of an area of lower and into an area of higher productivity
and greater yield” (see Drucker 1985). Since the work of
Schumpeter in the 1930s, the term is mostly identified with
innovation (Stevenson and Jarillo 1990). Gradually, scholars
have expanded the use of the idea of entrepreneurship and
adapted the concept from business to the public sector (deLeon
1996). Kingdon (1984:129), one of the first scholars to apply
the term entrepreneurs to the public sector, defines policy
entrepreneurs as “advocates for proposals or for the
prominence of ideas.” During the past decade, policy
entrepreneurs have increasingly become recognized as
important political actors. Mintrom (1997, 2000; Mintrom and
Vergari 1998), in particular, has done much to advance our
knowledge. 
We understand policy entrepreneurs to be risk-taking
bureaucrats who seek to change policy and are involved
throughout the policy-change process. This definition is,
among others, grounded in the work of Kingdon (1984) and
Mintrom (2000), who both maintain that the exact position of
policy entrepreneurs in the policy-making process is
unimportant. We concur with these authors in that policy
entrepreneurs are primarily identifiable by the actions they
take, rather than by the positions they hold. Yet, here, we
restrict the use of the term policy entrepreneurs to members
of regional bureaucracies in the area of water management.
Policy entrepreneurs are, much as in the case of business
entrepreneurs, on the alert for opportunities. Policy
entrepreneurs see chances to connect policy proposals
(solutions) to problems and participants (to political
momentum). One could argue that everyone involved in policy
making now and then sees policy gaps and contributes in some
sense to policy change. This does not, however, make them
policy entrepreneurs. We distinguish policy entrepreneurs
from policy intellectuals, who are only engaged in the
generation of innovative ideas; from knowledge brokers, who
provide links between different knowledge sources; and from
policy advocates, who mainly translate ideas into proposals.
In this study, policy entrepreneurs are instead understood as
actors who are involved throughout the policy-change process.
In addition, policy entrepreneurs differ from other participants
in policy making in their above-average willingness to take
risks and accept failure.
RESEARCH DESIGN
The case study informing our analysis on the actions of policy
entrepreneurs is the water management system in the
Netherlands. Dutch water management is highly consensus-
based, complex, and fragmented. It can be defined as a
multilevel governance system with a relatively high degree of
decentralization. Decision making is based on close
collaboration between the central government and authorities
at the regional (provinces and water boards) and local levels
(municipalities) (Kuks 2010, Van Leussen and Lulofs 2010).
Although there is a myriad of interesting developments in
Dutch water management that could be discussed, we intend
first and foremost to explain the actions of policy
entrepreneurs. Therefore, the policy changes in Dutch water
management only represent the case through which to examine
our actual unit of analysis—the individual policy
entrepreneur. 
We have chosen the Netherlands as a case because of its rich
and diverse institutional context in local and regional water
management. Furthermore, it represents an outstanding
example of a social-ecological system wherein through the
ages the flow and level of almost every water body has been
subject to human control (Kuks 2010). Given the new needs
to anticipate on (expected) climate change effects, such as
increasing river run-off and sea-level rise, in combination with
the continuous subsidence of soil, and the spatial claims of
housing, industry, infrastructure, and agriculture, Dutch water
projects require not only technical solutions (e.g., raising
dikes) but also complex spatial solutions, such as reserving
land for a floodplain (Roth and Warner 2007, Huitema and
Meijerink 2009b). As a consequence, rather than working
alone as they did in the past, Dutch water managers now often
need resources and support from a wide range of organizations,
policy programs, and policy domains and therefore must look
beyond their particular program and deal with greater levels
of coordinated action and strategic play (Van der Brugge et
al. 2005). In short, the problems facing Dutch water managers
have become increasingly, and fundamentally, more complex:
both the management of the system and the governing
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processes are in transition. This implies that many policy
changes in water management are needed, which makes the
country a highly interesting place to study the role and actions
of policy entrepreneurs. Table 1 provides two examples of the
types of projects with which policy entrepreneurs are typically
involved.
Table 1. Project examples.
Example 1: The Waterdunen project: In this innovative project in
the southwest portion of the Netherlands, an improvement of the
coastal defense is turned into a quality-improvement opportunity
of the nature, landscape, and recreation. It consists of the
realization of 250 hectares salty nature that is influenced by a
controlled tide. Waterdunen is a special plan with a number of
innovations, including a nontraditional form of cooperation, at
which public parties, private parties, and nongovernmental
organizations work together on the basis of equality.
Example 2: The Breakthrough project: In this extensive project
in the eastern portion of the Netherlands, a new 13-km-long
brook is created to separate the rural and urban water flow,
aiming at improving surface water quality. In addition, this new
waterway will provide an extra drainage possibility for excessive
water, ensuring that the safety of a sizable area will be improved.
Finally, the construction of the brook is a powerful stimulus for
the ecology and recreation.
To develop systematic ideas on these actions of policy
entrepreneurs, we conducted both theoretical and empirical
studies that encompassed the following steps: 
(1) First, we studied theoretical models in fields as diverse as
political science, public administration, network management,
and project management for assumptions and findings
regarding strategies that policy entrepreneurs can employ in
their efforts to pursue policy change. Based on this theoretical
study, we developed a set of strategies.  
(2) To investigate whether this set was applicable and to
investigate whether and how policy entrepreneurs actually use
these and/or other strategies, we conducted 10 semi-
structured, in-depth interviews with policy entrepreneurs in
Dutch water management in two rounds. The first round of
interviews was open and explorative but was structured around
two primary topics: the entrepreneurs' background, ambition,
and work context, and the step-by-step description of two
individual projects and the strategic decisions concerned. In
the second round of interviews, we confronted the same policy
entrepreneurs with statements on strategies and strategic
dilemmas based on the results of the first round. All interviews
were conducted in Dutch, yet we reproduced a small sample
of our interview questions (see Appendix 1), with the rest being
available on request. 
(3) To provide depth and detail on some of the topics discussed
in the first and second rounds of the interviews, we then
organized a focus group in which all but two of the interviewed
policy entrepreneurs participated. In addition, we conducted
an additional 15 interviews with experts in the field of policy
change in and around water boards (including members of the
board, consultants, and representatives from municipalities
and provinces). 
The policy entrepreneurs included in our study had been
selected by stratified sampling. In each geographically based
stratum, we randomly selected one water board in which a key
informant was identified to determine the most prominent
policy entrepreneur within the organization. The experts in the
field of policy change in and around water boards for the
additional interviews were selected after a workshop on water
management where our primary results were presented. To
maximize an atmosphere of openness and trust, all face-to-
face interviews were conducted at the work place of the
interviewee and strict anonymity was guaranteed. It is worth
noting that we found that policy entrepreneurs are not
necessary always aware of their strategic behavior. Only in
the course of the highly open and explorative interviews did
they become conscious of the many actions and strategic
choices they actually continuously employed in the highly
complex policy-change processes in which they are involved.
The next section contains the combined results of the
theoretical study on strategies along with the results of our
empirical research and an analysis on whether and how policy
entrepreneurs in Dutch water management employ these and/
or other strategies.
ENTREPRENEURIAL STRATEGIES
We found various strategies that policy entrepreneurs employ
in their efforts to pursue policy change. We inductively
established that this abundance of strategies- can be grouped
into four categories: (1) attention- and support-seeking
strategies, to demonstrate the significance of a problem and
to convince a wide range of participants about their preferred
policy; (2) linking strategies, to link with other parties in
coalitions, projects, ideas, and policy games; (3) relational
management strategies, to manage the relational factor in
policy change trajectories; and, finally, (4) arena strategies, to
influence the time and the place wherein policy entrepreneurs
act. Table 2 presents an overview of the four categories and
the subsumed strategies.
Attention- and support-seeking strategies
The ultimate goal of a policy entrepreneur is to achieve policy
change. Accordingly, an alternative idea or approach is a
prerequisite (Huitema and Meijerink 2010). Yet, rather than
the talent to develop new ideas, in this study on the subnational,
regional project level, we rather see the alertness for
opportunities to connect existing ideas to problems and
participants (to political momentum) as a key characteristic of
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successful policy entrepreneurs. In fact, most of the time,
people reformulate (old) ideas—coming from a plethora of
different sources—and combine them with others (Kingdon
1984, Mintrom 2000). Accordingly, we focus on the strategies
that policy entrepreneurs employ after they have seen an
opportunity for policy change and try to “sell” their preferred
idea. Thus, although we do not exclude the possibility that
policy entrepreneurs are at times involved in developing new
ideas, we do not consider this a strategy of individual policy
entrepreneurs (unlike Huitema and Meijerink 2010). Instead,
we are more interested in the process of what happens after 
policy entrepreneurs see an opportunity and what they actually
do in their effort to convince a wide range of individuals,
groups, and organizations of their preferred idea. The range
of strategies that policy entrepreneurs employ to “sell” their
ideas we call attention- and support-seeking strategies. We
identify five different attention- and support-seeking
strategies: the use of pilot projects, the demonstration of
indicators, the highlighting of focusing events, rhetoric
persuasion, and correlating.
Table 2. Strategies of policy entrepreneurs used in Dutch water
management.
Attention- and
support-
seeking
strategies
Linking
strategies
Relational
management
strategies
Arena
strategies
• Pilot projects
• Indicators
• Focusing
events
• Rhetoric
persuasion
• Correlating
• Coalition
building
• Selective
activation and
exclusion
• Issue linking
• Game linking
• Trust
building
• Networking
• Venue
shopping
• Timing
Demonstration of pilot projects, indicators, and focusing
events 
The literature provides ample hypotheses about the selection
processes by which new ideas and policy proposals are chosen
(see, e.g., Koppenjan 1993, Mintrom 2000). Important
strategies to draw attention to new ideas are the use of small-
scale pilot projects (Huitema and Meijerink 2009a) as well as
indicators and expert testimony (Kingdon 1984). Several
scholars, such as Cohen et al. (1972) and Kingdon (1984),
focus also on the relation of problem and solution. An
important element in their models is the understanding that,
in addition to problems in search of solutions, solutions might
also float around searching for problems. Accordingly, we
expect that, in their efforts to gain attention and support for a
new idea, policy entrepreneurs will also aim to demonstrate
the magnitude of a problem. To this end, we expect that policy
entrepreneurs will again use indicators and, more important,
highlight focusing events like crises or disasters (Kingdon
1984, Birkland 1988, Westley 2002, Ingram and Fraser 2006).
 
In our empirical research, we found indeed that policy
entrepreneurs in Dutch water management consider
indicators, expert testimony, and providing actual working
examples as important means to draw attention to their
advocated ideas. In addition, we found evidence in support of
Kingdon (1984), Birkland (1988), Westley (2002), Ingram and
Fraser (2006), and Huitema and Meijerink (2009a) that the
policy entrepreneurs also in Dutch local water management
now and then draw attention to focusing events like crises or
disasters to exhibit the significance of a problem. As one policy
entrepreneur put it, “Every now and then I wish for a small
calamity. Such events garner political support for my ideas,
be it on the condition that they are prepared in advance.” In
addition, we found that policy entrepreneurs in Dutch water
management not only use indicators and expert testimony to
gain support for their ideas but also to display the magnitude
of a problem. As one Dutch policy entrepreneur interviewed
for this study remarked, “High-quality reports with high-
quality appendices are needed, no blah blah stories … you
organize an information evening … and at a certain point they
will start believing you.” 
Rhetoric persuasion and correlating 
How a particular problem is defined is of great importance as
it shapes the direction in which possible solutions are sought.
In addition, depending on the definition, some actors are
involved whereas others are not, some are helped and others
hurt (Kingdon 1984, Stone 1997). Also in demonstrating the
importance and meaning of crises, or in displaying the success
of a pilot project, the specific wording can greatly affect the
likelihood of an innovation being introduced (Birkland 1988,
Dutton and Ashford 1993, Fischhendler and Zilberman 2005).
Therefore, we assume that rhetorical persuasion is an
important strategy for policy entrepreneurs. By using
rhetorical persuasion, policy entrepreneurs do not try to get
preferred policy innovations to be adopted by changing the
alternatives, but try to change preferences through arguing
within existing dimensions of current policy discussions. It
often implies that policy entrepreneurs adapt their way of
speaking and decide which aspects of the problem or the
solution they want to emphasize or downplay depending on
the positions and preoccupations of different participants.  
The importance of rhetorical persuasion is well supported by
evidence from our study. Rhetorical persuasion appears to be
very important in the entrepreneurs' efforts to draw attention
and gain support for the problem they aim to solve and their
advocated “solution.” In fact, all policy entrepreneurs
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interviewed argued that the interpretation of a crisis or data
really can transform conditions into problems. In addition, our
interviews were rich with examples showing that policy
entrepreneurs often adapt their way of speaking depending on
the positions and preoccupations of different participants. For
example, a policy entrepreneur explained, “When I aim to
acquire a European subsidy, I emphasize the social, economic,
and ecological problems in the area. But when I try to acquire
a provincial subsidy for the very same project, I tell them how
the project complements with their program.” This finding is
in coherence with the work of many scholars, including
Birkland (1988) and Stone (1997). Finally, we found that, in
the entrepreneurs' efforts to open up new policy opportunities,
the role of problems is of at least equal importance to the role
of ideas. Policy entrepreneurs do no stop with “simply” asking
for attention to a problem and demonstrating their ideas.
Instead, they work very hard to present their idea as a solution
to the identified problem. The corresponding strategy, which
we call the correlating strategy, might sound straightforward,
yet is so far mostly neglected or at least underexposed in the
literature.
Linking strategies
In theory, policy entrepreneurs pursuing policy change have
the choice to realize their plans and ideas on their own or in
collaboration. In practice, however, the scale (and levels) at
which problems are experienced regularly do not correspond
to the scale at which decision-making bodies operate. For this
reason, policy entrepreneurs are mostly unable to accomplish
their objectives alone and frequently seek collaboration and
link with individuals and groups in a coalition. Aside from
coalition building, policy entrepreneurs employ three other
linking strategies: selective activation and exclusion, issue
linking, and game linking. 
Coalition building, selective activation, and exclusion 
According to the literature, various individuals, groups, and
organizations are often involved in a specific policy issue and/
or the necessary resources to accomplish the change, such as
physical resources, juridical resources, money, knowledge,
and support, are often divided over different individuals,
groups, and organizations (Booher and Innes 2000, Koppenjan
and Klijn 2004). Accordingly, we assume that policy
entrepreneurs in Dutch water management frequently
experience dependency on the actions or resources of others
and collaborate with others. The degree to which collaboration
is needed is based on various factors and will differ from
situation to situation. To use the words of Dutton and Ashford
(1993), the choice is not so much whether a coalition needs to
be built, but rather what kind of coalition. Also in Huitema
and Meijerink (2010), coalition building is defined as an
important strategy.  
Connected with coalition building is the strategy of selective
activation and exclusion. Because the joining of forces
generally entails sensitive issues, such as differences of policy
objectives and power asymmetries, coalition building is often
delicate (Huitema and Meijerink 2009a). Accordingly, we
assume that policy entrepreneurs are liable to apply the
selective activation strategy, that is, “assess which actors are
essential at given moments in a policy process, whether and
how to involve them” (Pahl-Wostl et al. 2006:26). This can
also imply exclusion, that is, deliberatively leaving out actors
(in particular stages) of a policy-making process. Some argue
that policy making can be improved by activating more
participants as they bring in new solutions and resources
(Teisman 1990), whereas Mintzberg et al. (1996) state that
more participants implies inevitably more complexity and
more complicated negotiations.  
In theory, policy entrepreneurs pursuing change have the
choice to realize their plans and ideas on their own or in
collaboration. In practice, it appears that policy change in
Dutch water management can hardly be realized individually.
This drives the building of coalitions. For this reason, and in
line with the research of Mintrom (1997, 2000) and Huitema
and Meijerink (2010), policy entrepreneurs in Dutch water
management frequently seek collaboration and link with
individuals and groups in coalitions: “Even for our own water
retention projects it is impossible to say ‘we can plan, organize
and implement our ideas ourselves’; that is not the way it
works.” The most frequently, but not exclusively, noted
motivation for coalition building was the acquisition of money
and support. In addition, learning or knowledge generation is
an important motivation for policy entrepreneurs to
collaborate. As one policy entrepreneur noted, “Next year we
are going to implement a fish stock policy so we involved the
angler groups. They do not have any money, but they have
knowledge.” Then again, we found that policy entrepreneurs
not always opt for large coalitions, let alone for processes of
collaborative problem solving. Our in-depth empirical study
of policy entrepreneurs in Dutch water management revealed
that policy entrepreneurs indeed employ the strategy of
selective activation and, at times, exclusion. This finding
corroborates with the work of Pahl-Wostl et al. (2006). To be
more precise, we found that policy entrepreneurs reflect deeply
about not only when to involve which parties but also on the
total number of participants in a coalition. Even though we
observed that the policy entrepreneurs in Dutch water
management operate in complex systems, they do not view all
issues as highly complex and accordingly assess broad
coalitions strategically. Other times, we found that policy
entrepreneurs, in the view of the complexity of the issue itself,
feel collaborative problem solving could be beneficial but still
opt for small coalitions because actors might be unwilling to
cooperate or because time or resources are lacking. The fear
for complication and stagnation, however, is the most
important motivation to avoid broad coalitions. This last
argument, in particular, provides support for the work of
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Fischhendler (2004), Koppenjan and Klijn (2004), and Innes
and Booher (2010). Our research suggests that policy
entrepreneurs are generally very good in making appraisals as
to when to involve which actors; nonetheless, we found that,
from time to time, policy entrepreneurs face the dilemma of
small versus broad coalitions. As one policy entrepreneur
interviewed for this study remarked, “At times it is better to
involve that specific party, other times it is not. It is a matter
of tactics.” Yet, the overall feeling of policy entrepreneurs in
Dutch water management is that it is not strategic to exclude
or deactivate parties: “The exclusion of parties is never a smart
idea. You will always meet them again and this can frustrate
your interest tremendously.”  
Issue linking 
Based on the work of Mintrom (2000), we expected that policy
entrepreneurs must also be prepared to adjust their preferred
problem definition and ideas for policy change to the interests
and expectations of other participants. Such strategy is known
as issue linking. It entails the linking of two or more issues,
both the addition of dimensions to a problem and the
combination of solutions with other solutions, for substantive
and/or strategic reasons. Issue linking may contribute to
different approaches, richer debates, and more successful
outcomes (Teisman 1990, de Bruijn and ten Heuvelhof 2000).
Because different individuals, groups, or organizations
involved in policy formation become co-responsible for
decisions, issue linking might also lead to more social and
political support. At the same time, it may be a mechanism to
realign or break existing coalitions (Fischhendler and
Zilberman 2005). Yet, because participants are more likely to
defend their own interests, this strategy does not always pay
off and may cause delays, stagnation, or even conflicts
(Fischhendler 2004, Koppenjan and Klijn 2004, Meijerink
2008).  
The importance of issue linking is well supported by evidence
from our comprehensive study of Dutch policy entrepreneurs
in the water management sector. In their efforts to realize their
preferred policy change, policy entrepreneurs not only link
with other actors and parties, but also link problems and
solutions. We found that policy entrepreneurs repeatedly take
different problem perceptions and interests into account
aiming to develop and select a solution that is satisfying for
all relevant participants. In line with Teisman (1990) and de
Bruijn and ten Heuvelhof (2000), all interviewed
entrepreneurs felt that issue linking, if launched at the right
moment, increases the likelihood of a better solution: “If you
realize with a number of parties multiple goals on the same
unit of land/plot … for the same, or perhaps less money, you
can have a better plan.” The strategy of issue linking is not
exclusively employed for the good of the product but also for
the process. As one policy entrepreneur remarked: “If you only
try to reach your own goal … at a certain point you run up
against so many objections from other parties that you can not
make progress anymore.” Aside from the advantages of issue
linking, policy entrepreneurs experienced the dangers in terms
of complication and stagnation, similar to what we have seen
related to coalition building. As a result, they often reported
facing a “single multi-issue” dilemma: “At times, it is hard to
say what is best. Linking generates high value-added projects,
at the same time, however, it may also cause more complexity,
delays, and less mandate.”  
Game linking 
Policy change does not occur in a vacuum but in an arena with
many ongoing policy games with partly overlapping issues
and participants. Accordingly, efforts to change policy are
influenced by other games, taking place at the same time or
even in the future. Although this phenomenon may complicate
efforts of realizing policy change, based on the work of
Axelrod and Keohane (1985) and Putnam (1988), among
others, we expect that policy entrepreneurs will also link
games strategically. Game linking entails the linking of two
or more parallel or future policy games, which opens up
possibilities to find mutually acceptable concession packages. 
In our study, we found that policy entrepreneurs in Dutch water
management strategically link one or more games, and hence
found support for the work of Axelrod and Keohane (1985)
and Putnam (1988). A policy entrepreneur explained the
choice to support a certain nonessential plan: “For [us] this
plan is only negative, there is zero advantage … Still, we
support it as we hope that they will support us with our project
in the future.” This citation shows us that policy entrepreneurs
indeed note that strategic moves at one game table might
facilitate or obstruct coalitions at the second table, and why
policy entrepreneurs are sometimes prepared to take loss. In
connection with this strategy, we found that policy
entrepreneurs frequently face the dilemma between holding
on to a certain position versus giving it away with the aim to
receive better rewards (compensation) in another (future)
game. Given that the same participants frequently need each
other in parallel or future policy games, policy entrepreneurs
state that the rules of the game are often played in such a
manner that relations are not deteriorated.
Relational management strategies
In policy games, policy entrepreneurs inevitably do not deal
with abstract representatives from “the other side” but with
human beings with emotions, values, and ideas. Consequently,
the policy game always has two outcomes: one substantive
and one relational. The human aspect can help enormously
when relations are characterized by mutual trust, respect, or
even friendship. At the same time, when people feel angry,
offended, annoyed, or betrayed, negotiations can be very
difficult (Fisher et al. 1983, Koppenjan and Klijn 2004).
Accordingly, it makes sense for a policy entrepreneur to
negotiate in a way that fosters future good relations and does
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not deteriorate them (Mintrom 2000, Koppenjan and Klijn
2004). Policy entrepreneurs use two main strategies: trust
building and networking. 
Trust building 
The theoretical notion of the importance of relational
management is supported by our study. We found that policy
entrepreneurs in Dutch water management are very sensitive
to the fact that they deal with human beings with emotions,
values, and ideas. Hence, they stated that good relationships
are crucial for the process of policy change: “Poor
relationships can result in terrible delays; they make it very
hard to reach your goals quickly.” “When you reach your goal
at the expense of your relationships, you will have to be very
sure that you won’t need that relation in the future. If you will
need that relation in the future, you are certainly lost.” Because
most negotiations take place within existing relations, most
interviewed policy entrepreneurs note that they always try to
create or maintain good relations for the pursuit of their goals.
In this regard, they state that it is important to display
cooperative behavior and perhaps even more important to
develop relationships of trust, and with that established
evidence in support of the work of Kingdon (1984), Schneider
et al. (1995), Mintrom (2000), Williams (2002), and Huitema
and Meijerink (2010). At the same time, they confirmed how
difficult and time consuming it is to build relationships of trust
and how easy it is to lose it: “If at a certain point in time you
can show that you keep your promise, you become a serious
partner … It is devastating if you make an agreement and can
not honor it” … “It only has to happen once and you have
absolute distrust.” What we expected less, however, is the
critical importance of trust building. Yet, policy entrepreneurs
in Dutch water management emphasized the importance of
working toward good relations characterized by respect and
mutual trust more than any other strategy. In this regard, it is
interesting to note that, in the literature on adaptive co-
management and resilience, the importance of building trust
actually is recognized (Olsson et al. 2004, Lebel et al. 2005,
Hahn et al. 2006, Berkes 2009).  
Networking 
Given that policy entrepreneurs are mostly dependent on other
parties, it can be expected that policy entrepreneurs will invest
time and energy to build or maintain good relations by both
formally and informally talking with and listening to a broad
set of actors engaged in a certain domain, a strategy we refer
to as networking. Networks matter because they help policy
entrepreneurs to discover opportunities to build coalitions and
gather reliable information in a relatively easy and efficient
manner. Moreover, networking enables the entrepreneur to
understand the preferences and worries of other participants
(Kingdon 1984, Schneider et al. 1995, Mintrom 2000,
Williams 2002). Indeed, also in Huitema and Meijerink's
(2010) set of strategies, the strategy of the orchestration and
managing of networks is prominently present. Research
indicates that networks differ in nature; some networks can be
long lasting, involving few interdependent actors frequently
interacting, whereas others can be loosely integrated and
relatively ad hoc. By definition, networks are always broader
if compared with a coalition (Stevenson and Jarillo 1990).
Important in this respect is the concept of redundancy: the key
of networking is building relations not only with parties that
are directly necessary, but also with those not directly needed
in order to reach certain goals (de Bruijn and ten Heuvelhof
2000). Westley (2002) argues that cooperative behavior and
networking is not only valid for external partners but also for
within the internal organization.  
This study indeed found that policy entrepreneurs in Dutch
water management generally spend much time networking.
As one policy entrepreneur put it: “I try to attend any meeting
… whether it is from the farmers or nature conservationists
… I am a member of all relevant organizations. Moreover, I
keep up with what happens in the municipal councils, also on
my evenings off.” Hence, we established evidence in support
of the work of Kingdon (1984), Schneider et al. (1995),
Mintrom (2000), Williams (2002), and Huitema and Meijerink
(2010). The entrepreneurs report that networks matter because
they help them discover new ideas and opportunities.
Networking enables them to understand the preferences, plans,
worries, and world views of the other participants. This
knowledge helps them to discover opportunities for coalition
building, issue linking, and game linking. In addition, they
state that networking helps them to determine which
arguments will persuade others to support their policy ideas.
As one Dutch policy entrepreneur interviewed for this study
remarked, “I think it is important to see which way the wind
blows by a wide range of people … it is key to get a feeling
about people's ideas.”  
As a final point, the policy entrepreneurs in our study
emphasized that relational management is by no means solely
an external concern. Instead, the present study revealed that
policy entrepreneurs perceive networking within their internal
organization as being at least as important as networking with
external partners. They feel the game within their organization
(support of the internal political board and bureaucratic
organization) is as crucial as the external game. As one policy
entrepreneur noted, “If you negotiate with partners about a
project, perhaps the negotiation process back home is even
more important.” This finding is consistent with that of
Westley (2002), yet the great importance that policy
entrepreneurs attach to it is a new insight.
Arena strategies
Other than attention- and support-seeking strategies, linking
strategies, and relational management strategies, policy
entrepreneurs play strategically with the time and place of the
policy process. In other words, they can strategically play with
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the policy arena, that is, the locus in which their policy game
is placed and wherein problem definitions and policy ideas are
turned into policy decisions (Timmermans and Bleiklie 1999).
There are two different arena strategies, one focusing on place,
and one focusing on time: the venue shopping and the timing
strategy.  
Venue shopping 
Venue shopping is associated with the choice between the
various possible places where one can effect change. By
employing this strategy, policy entrepreneurs “try to alter the
roster of participants who are involved in the issue by seeking
out the most favorable venue for the consideration of their
issues” (Baumgartner and Jones 1991:1045). At some points,
policy entrepreneurs might prefer to act in accordance with
regular and established procedures, whereas at other moments,
or even in parallel, they might prefer a venue without the usual
or prescribed procedures. Possible venues include not only
different levels of government but also regulatory agencies
and legislative bodies (McCown 2004). Especially in
surroundings that provide little or no support for policy
change, venue shopping can improve the policy entrepreneurs'
chances for success and therefore lead to dramatic reversals
in policy outcomes (Baumgartner and Jones 1991, Mintrom
2000). For this reason, and in accordance with Huitema and
Meijerink (2010), we expected that venue shopping is an
important strategy for policy entrepreneurs. 
In our study, we found that most policy entrepreneurs noted
that venue shopping can potentially result in new sets of
participants involved in a particular policy issue and therefore
may disarm opponents or strengthen the position of supporters
of a particular policy change. Yet, contrary to our expectation,
policy entrepreneurs most often experience very little freedom
in the choice of possible places where they could effect change.
In other words, it became clear that, at the subnational regional
level, where concrete projects needs to be realized, the
recognition, exploitation, and manipulation of different
venues are only a strategy of minor importance. This is
different from the national level (Meijerink and Huitema
2010). Presumably, this distinction can be explained by
differences in institutional context, as the subnational regional
level might offer less alternative venues than the national
context. Only in terms of subsidy acquisitions, policy
entrepreneurs in Dutch water management feel that venue
shopping can be fruitful and enhance their chances of policy
change. 
Timing 
A second arena strategy is timing. In a variety of ways, time
plays an important role in policy making. Time is not only the
outcome of a process; it has an independent influence on the
process as well. Strategies to influence time differ in their
extent. Kingdon (1984) notes that policy entrepreneurs should
be alert to the right moments and refers to this chance for action
as the opening of the policy window. Due to the short moments
of opening windows, it is crucial for policy entrepreneurs to
recognize and exploit those moments appropriately (Kingdon
1984, Huitema and Meijerink 2010). In anticipating the
presence or absence of policy windows, policy entrepreneurs
can try to speed up or slow down the policy-making process.
Yet, as the sense of urgency and willingness to change
perceptions will not continue indefinitely, focusing events can
only create opportunities when the timing is right, and the
moment in which ideas are presented and participants get
involved is highly important (de Bruijn and ten Heuvelhof
2000), we expected that the timing strategy also functions as
an overarching, or meta-, strategy. 
The notion that timing is important is supported by our study.
In line with Kingdon (1984) and Huitema and Meijerink
(2010), we found that policy entrepreneurs in Dutch water
management are always on the lookout for policy windows.
Besides, policy entrepreneurs play for time by slowing down,
requesting a time out, or asking for more research. Deadlines,
on the other hand, are used to accelerate the process, even if
policy entrepreneurs are aware that these effects are not always
straightforward. In addition, the interviews revealed that
policy entrepreneurs act strategically with deadlines initiated
by other parties. One of them explained his reaction on a
deadline set by the other party: “Since I am not in a hurry,
setting a deadline would be really stupid. Whereas the other
party feels the pressure, we won't negotiate until very close to
the deadline … this makes our position much stronger.” More
importantly, the policy entrepreneurs interviewed for this
study regularly underlined the importance of timing in relation
to the different attention- and support-seeking, linking, and
relational management strategies, and herewith provide
evidence for our assumption that timing functions also as a
metastrategy. For example, and consistent with the suggestion
of de Bruijn and ten Heuvelhof (2000), policy entrepreneurs
feel that it is better to involve participants at an early stage to
prevent resistance. At the same time, they indicated that
engaging too early can be unfavorable. “It works
counterproductive when you involve people too early. If you
can only say ‘there is something we want, but we do not know
what and when’, you only foster fantasies, ghosts, and stirs up
trouble.”
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
This micro-level study on strategies of policy entrepreneurs
working in regional project settings generated more in-depth
knowledge and more detailed understanding of the variety and
diversity of strategies that policy entrepreneurs employ. We
found that, in their efforts to direct policy change, policy
entrepreneurs in Dutch water management employ a wealth
of strategies that can be grouped into attention- and support-
seeking strategies, linking strategies, relational management
strategies, and arena strategies. In this manner, our study
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contributed important new empirical and theoretical insights
to explain policy change. This study complements the work
of several other scholars who described the strategic behavior
of policy entrepreneurs (e.g., King and Roberts 1987,
Schneider et al. 1995, Mintrom and Vergari 1998, Mintrom
2000). It also complements the work of Robert and King
(1991) and, more recently, Huitema and Meijerink (2009a,
2010), who offered a detailed description of entrepreneurial
strategies, yet had a different focus. Huitema and Meijerink
(2010) focused on policy transitions at the national level and
based their theoretical analysis therefore primarily on the
policy sciences literature. In this study, our focus is on the
subnational level, where most practical projects are carried
out. For this reason, we also extensively draw on the literature
on project management and network management. Yet,
overall, our findings support their earlier study. Also at the
subnational regional level, policy entrepreneurs build
coalitions and sell ideas, orchestrate and manage networks,
and recognize and exploit windows of opportunity. Yet, unlike
at the national level, the recognition, exploitation, and
manipulation of different venues are much less important at
the subnational level. Also, the first strategy identified by
Huitema and Meijerink (2010)—the development of new
ideas—is not identified as a separate strategy in this study.  
Apart from the contributions on the strategies themselves, our
comprehensive study in the Dutch water management sector
generated several additional important findings. Policy
entrepreneurs by no means employ the foregoing strategies in
a chronological order. Instead, we found that policy
entrepreneurs concurrently employ attention- and support-
seeking strategies, linking strategies, relational management
strategies, and arena strategies. Using Westley's (2002)
conceptualization that envisions strategies as balls, one can
conclude that, in order to be successful, policy entrepreneurs
must constantly juggle all balls and cannot neglect or drop a
single one. We concluded that policy entrepreneurs in their
juggling efforts constantly focus on three strategic focal
points. First, they use strategies to draw attention to new
problems or to change existing problem definitions. Secondly,
entrepreneurs use strategies to introduce (new) solutions or
the perception of them. Thirdly, entrepreneurs use strategies
to maintain or change the constitution of, or relation with,
participants. Following the conceptualization of the stream
models by Cohen et al. (1972) and Kingdon (1984), we can
say that policy entrepreneurs pay close attention to three
streams: the problem stream, the solution stream, and the
participation stream. Interestingly, we found that most
strategies are used to direct more than one stream. The strategy
of rhetorical persuasion, for example, is used to influence the
perception of the problem and the solution as well as to build
trust and facilitate collaboration. But we found more
interlinkages between the three streams and the strategies. For
example, the problem definition itself, as well as the policy
proposition, is affected by who is involved, just as the actors'
decisions of whether or not to participate in a particular policy
issue depends on the definition of the problem, the proposed
solution, and the existing relationship. In addition, changes in
the proposed solutions can affect existing problem definitions
and vice versa. This leads us to the conclusion that, in contrast
to Kingdon's argument, the streams affect each other as they
develop. 
What is more, whereas Kingdon (1984) assumes that
developing and coupling of streams develops rather
unpredictably and only when the “time is right,” our study
suggests that, by employing certain strategies, the
development of streams and their coupling can to some extent
also be influenced and steered. On the basis of what policy
entrepreneurs put forward in our interviews, we conclude that,
by operating strategically, policy entrepreneurs are indeed, to
some degree, capable of directing policy change. This fairly
optimistic finding is in contrast to what is suggested in many
prevailing theories on policy change, in which it is commonly
assumed that policy change is nearly impossible to realize
without, for example, the occurrence of external shocks
(Sabatier and Weible 2007) or punctuations (Baumgartner and
Jones 1991). Yet, given the wide range of strategies that policy
entrepreneurs use in Dutch water management, one may ask
whether the conclusion would be justified that this steering
and coupling is straightforward and unproblematic. The
strategic dilemmas that this study has uncovered alone suggest
that this is certainly not the case. Nevertheless, our findings
are promising in the light of the fact that the capability to adapt
to and to direct change is a key element of resilience in social-
ecological systems (Gunderson 1999, Folke et al. 2005). In
connection with this, it is worth noting that policy
entrepreneurs generally appear to be very good at making
appraisals as to when to involve which actors. At times, policy
entrepreneurs advocate broad coalitions or even processes of
collaborative management, along the lines of adaptive co-
management (Olsson et al. 2007, Berkes 2009). Other times,
they consciously avoid such processes, often because they fear
complication and stagnation, from time to time also because
they simply want their idea to be accepted. This latter finding
corroborates the work of Meijerink and Huitema (2010).
However, their conclusion that policy entrepreneurs thus
“create barriers to future change” needs refining. Policy
entrepreneurs in Dutch water management are constantly on
the alert for future policy-change opportunities, and by no
means do they only focus on one single transition. In fact,
unlike the findings at the national level by Huitema and
Meijerink (2010), we observed that, at a subnational regional
level, policy entrepreneurs frequently employ strategies (in
particular the game linking strategy), precisely for the reason
that they are also involved in both concurrent and future
policy-change trajectories. 
Ecology and Society 16(4): 5
http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol16/iss4/art5/
The above conclusions about policy entrepreneurs and policy
change are important but need also to be approached with some
caution, which points to further research needs. First, the
number of interviewees in this study is relatively limited; for
increased validity, future research should encompass a wider
set of respondents. Second, it would be interesting to see to
what extent, if at all, there are differences between the
strategies of policy entrepreneurs and those of political and
public entrepreneurs, which are not included in this study. A
third limitation of this study is that we did not follow policy-
change projects in time but discussed processes
retrospectively. To deepen our understanding of the success
and appropriateness of distinct entrepreneurial strategies and
to examine when strategies are combined with what effect,
such an alternative approach would be recommended. Fourth,
as to better understand to what extent the context in which this
research was conducted might have influenced our results—
that is, a small country marked by a dense and highly
consensus-based policy network—future research needs to
draw on an extended research design that includes
international comparisons. After all, Te Boekhorst et al. (2010)
have shown that policy entrepreneurs in a centralized country
such as China have a rather different role and position as
compared with those in European countries.
Responses to this article can be read online at:
http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol16/iss4/art5/responses/
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All interviews were conducted in Dutch. The questions below are translated by the authors. 
 
Round 1: The first round of interviews was highly open and explorative and structured around 
two primary topics: the entrepreneurs' background, ambition, and work context, and the step-by-
step description of the strategic decisions taken in the context of two highly innovative and 
complex projects they were involved with. The original questionnaire included 55 questions. 
 
1. How would you describe the main goals of the project? 
2. How would you describe the discussions in your internal organization at the start and during 
this project? How did you cope with these discussions? 
3. In the course of the project, did partners join or drop out? Which? When? Why?  
4. If at all, what was the influence of prior experiences with involved partners on the project? 
5. If at all, what kind of problems did you encounter along the process? How were these 
problems solved? 
6. Did you notice typical breakthroughs during the project? If so, when?  
7. Did you foresee these breakthroughs? If so, how did you recognize them? 
8. Is it possible to steer these breakthroughs? If so, how? 
9. If at all, what dilemmas played a role during this project?  
10. What choices did you make concerning these dilemmas? Why? 
 
Round 2: In the second round, we confronted the same policy entrepreneurs with 20 statements 
on strategies and strategic dilemmas based on the results of the first open  round. These 
statements are oversimplified by design; however, in the answers, we were most interested in the 
nuance. 
 
1. I feel it is more strategic to link with other plans instead of initiating a new/personal plan.  
2. Good relations are more important than fast goal achievement. 
3. I prefer tough playing over conflict avoidance. 
4. I involve other partners as soon as possible. 
 I prefer achieving goals now over achieving goals in the future.
APPENDIX 1. Sample of interview questions
